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Abstract: Prior literature has provided inconclusive results concerning the 
relationship between corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) and 
earnings management (EM). This study examines the relation between CSRD 
and EM. For this study, 479 annual reports of publicly listed Indonesian 
companies were selected as the sample. The two-stage least square (2SLS) 
method was employed to test the relationship between CSRD and EM. Our 
findings suggest that companies that have high CSRD are less likely to manage 
earnings. Moreover, our findings suggest that the relationship between CSRD 
and EM can be viewed as a substitute mechanism. This study contributes to the 
accounting literature by examining the relationship between CSRD and EM in 
the setting of an emerging country. 
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1 Introduction 
A company is required to generate profits; however, it also has a responsibility to the 
communities and environment where it operates. To maintain continuity of operations, 
most of company in the world engaged in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. 
The main principle of CSR is that company is committed to conducting its business in a 
sustainable way. In particular, how companies account for the impact of its business 
activities to stakeholders with a transparent and ethical behaviour. One way to be 
responsible is to provide stakeholders with information regarding the company’s CSR 
activities through disclosure. Disclosure has an important function in providing financial 
reports. In providing the information, it requires companies to be more transparent. 
Ideally, corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) is considered to be an 
accountability tool that provides transparent and reliable information to all stakeholders 
(Kim et al., 2012). However, in engaging in and providing CSR information, companies 
may also have opportunistic incentives (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Pyo and Le, 
2013). If managers engage in and disclose CSR activities based on opportunistic 
incentives, then they are likely to mislead stakeholders about the value of the firm and its 
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financial performance (Kim et al., 2012). Hemingway and Maclagan (2004) argue that 
managers may participate in CSR activities to cover the corporation’s illicit activities, 
one of the illicit activity is earnings management (EM) practices (Grougiou et al., 2014). 
Prior studies have provided mixed conclusions regarding the relationship between 
CSRD and EM. Some researchers have argued that CSRD has a negative relationship 
with EM (see for example, Chih et al., 2008; Hong and Andersen, 2011; Kim et al., 2012; 
Scholtens and Kang, 2013; Litt et al., 2014; Martínez-Ferrero et al., 2015a; Muttakin  
et al., 2015; Gras-Gil et al., 2016; Almahrog et al., 2018). Choi et al. (2013) argue that 
company which actively involved in CSR activities will provide more transparent 
financial information. This view is motivated by the company’s commitment to 
maintaining long-term relationships with stakeholders rather than maximise short-term 
profit. However, CSRD could also be used as a tool to cover up EM practices. Prior 
studies found that EM is positively associated with CSRD (see for example, Prior et al., 
2008; Choi et al., 2013). Prior et al. (2008) argued that managers that have incentives to 
manage earnings tend to be more aggressive in the disclosure of CSR activities in order 
to maintain their reputation. Choi et al. (2013) argued that, to maintain the success of a 
business, managers that perform EM will invest more of their funds in CSR activities  
to keep their opportunistic behaviour from being detected – while maintaining the 
company’s legitimacy. 
The relation between CSRD and EM might be endogenous, raising doubts about the 
explanation of causality. Thus, there is room for this study to further examine the 
relationship of these two variables. The objective of this study is to examine the 
interrelationship between CSRD and EM. Specifically, this study examines: 
1 whether CSRD can limit the practice of EM 
2 whether firms that managed their earnings will disclose more about CSR activities. 
As an emerging country, Indonesia represents an interesting case when exploring the 
practices of CSRD and EM. First, Indonesian companies, for some time now, have been 
facing a number of factors exposing them to CSR practices. These include the issues of 
poverty alleviation, health and safety of the environment, pollution, deforestation, social 
and political insecurity and the high needs for direct foreign investment [Djajadikerta and 
Trireksani, (2012), p.22]. Second, Indonesia is the first country that obligates company to 
implement and report CSR activities. The social and environmental problems have 
triggered the government to set regulations related to social and environmental activities. 
Therefore, Indonesian Government released the new legislations, namely Company Law 
Number 40 (2007) and Government Regulation Number 47 (2012). These regulations 
require companies running their business activities in the field and/or related to the 
natural resources to implement social and environmental responsibility (Article 74, 
paragraph 1). Any company that does not perform this obligation will be sanctioned in 
accordance with the provisions of the legislation (Article 74, paragraph 3). Prior studies 
show that CSR practices in Indonesia has been growing (Siregar and Bachtiar, 2010; 
Cahaya et al., 2015). However, in term of CSR disclosure practices is still low (Rusmanto 
and Williams, 2015; Joseph et al., 2016; Amran et al., 2017). Third, in the context of 
financial reporting’s transparency, a survey by the Asian Development Bank (ADB)  
in 2014 concluded that disclosure and transparency were poorly implemented by  
some Indonesian publicly listed companies (PLCs). Though corporate governance 
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performance improved significantly in 2013 compared to 2012, the performance was still 
unsatisfactory compared to other ASEAN countries (Asian Development Bank, 2014). 
The results of this study are expected to contribute in a theoretical and practical related  
to how CSRD practices may affect EM practices in the context of developing countries. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the research provides 
further evidence on the interrelationship between CSRD and EM practices in an emerging 
country. Most previous studies on this topic have been conducted in developed countries, 
such as the USA (Hong and Andersen, 2011; Yip et al., 2011; Grougiou et al., 2014) or 
the UK (Sun et al., 2010; Almahrog et al., 2018). Some studies have even used 
international data (Chih et al., 2008; Prior et al., 2008; Surroca and Tribó, 2008; Kim  
et al., 2012; Scholtens and Kang, 2013; Litt et al., 2014; Martínez-Ferrero et al., 2014, 
2015b). Second, this study contrasts with these previous studies in terms of the 
measurement variables of CSRD. These prior studies used the CSR index issued by 
international rating agencies such as KLD or SiRi ranking index (Almahrog et al.,  
2018). This study measures the CSRD index using a content analysis method with an 
unweighted index approach. This technique is considered far less subjective than a 
weighted index and is more relevant to all companies (Cooke, 1989, 1993). 
Third, this study examines the simultaneous relationship between CSRD and EM. By 
examining the simultaneous relationship, it can reduce the potential bias in the estimation 
and misinterpretation of the results by clarifying whether CSRD determines EM practices 
or vice versa. Finally, most prior studies have viewed the relationship between CSRD and 
EM through the agency theory lens. This study employs the stakeholder-agency theory 
(SAT). Agency theory has been widely used in the literature to explain the relationship 
between disclosure and EM. The main focus of agency theory is explaining the 
relationship between the agent and the stockholders. However, the nature of contractual 
relationships between firms and stakeholders, such as in the CSRD and EM context has 
not been explored [Hill and Jones, (2002), p.131]. Thus, this study can provide additional 
insights into how SAT explains the relationship between CSRD and EM. 
The research questions to be answered are, first, does the extent of CSRD influence 
EM? Second, does EM influence the extent of CSRD? Finally, are the relationship 
between CSRD and EM complement or substitute mechanism? 
2 Literature review 
2.1 Stakeholder-agency theory 
SAT was derived from stakeholder theory and agency theory. Hill and Jones (2002) 
proposed this paradigm to help explain: certain aspects of firms’ strategic behaviours, the 
relationships between the structure of management and stakeholder contracts, the form 
taken by institutional structures that monitor and enforce contracts between managers and 
other stakeholders, the evolutionary process that shapes management-stakeholder 
contracts and the institutional structures that police those contracts. SAT not only 
considers a firm to be a nexus of contracts between a shareholder but it also encompasses 
the implicit and explicit contractual relationship between all stakeholders [Hill and Jones, 
(2002), p.132]. Furthermore, they explain that, in terms of SAT, managers have a unique  
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role model (which is not only the agent of the firm’s principal but also the agent of other 
stakeholder). The agency theory has explained that the principal hires the manager to 
conduct duties and rewards the manager when the duties are completed. In this case, 
however, the manager is only hired by the firm. Despite that, there is an association 
between the stakeholder-agent relationship and the principal-agent relationship, which 
involves an implicit and explicit contract to accommodate different interests [Hill and 
Jones, (2002), p.134]. Managers not only have a relationship or association with the 
business owners or shareholders but also with other stakeholders in the company [Prior  
et al., (2008), p.162]. In the context of SAT, CSRD activities are seen as an effort  
to maintain the company’s good relations with stakeholders, such as shareholders, 
employees, customers, suppliers and communities. 
2.2 CSRD and EM 
Prior literature has provided inconclusive results concerning the relationship between 
CSRD and EM. Choi et al. (2013) argued that the relationship between CSRD and EM 
can be viewed based on long-term perspective motivation. Evidences support these 
arguments that CSRD is negatively associated with EM. Using a sample of 139 firms in 
ten Asian countries, Scholtens and Kang (2013) studied how earnings smoothing and 
earnings aggressiveness are associated with CSRD. They used earnings smoothing and 
earnings aggressiveness as EM indicators and sustainability index FTSE4Good Global 
Company to measure CSR performance. Their main result suggested that firms with good 
CSR are less likely to manage earnings. Kim et al. (2012) examined whether firms 
engage in CSR are likely to provide more transparent financial information. The CSR 
score released by KLD is used as CSR construct. Based on a sample of 18,160 firm-year 
observations from 1991 to 2009, they found that CSR firms are less likely to engage in 
aggressive EM through discretionary accruals and real activities manipulation (RAM). 
Further, they suggested that CSR firms are prudent in financial reporting to maintain their 
reputation and financial performance. 
Current studies also provided the consistent results that companies engaged more in 
CSRD activities are less likely to manage earnings. For example, Almahrog et al. (2018) 
investigated the effect of CSRD on EM using 503 non-financial FTSE 350 UK 
companies during the period of 2008–2010. They found that firms with higher level of 
CSRD tend to engage in low magnitude of EM. Their result also concluded that  
firms using disclosure of CSR activities to reduce information asymmetry with their 
stakeholder, at the same time to enhance the good relationship with them. A negative 
relationship between CSRD and EM is consistent with Litt et al. (2014), Hong and 
Andersen (2011), Gras-Gil et al. (2016), Amar and Chakroun (2018) and Chepurko et al. 
(2018) 
In sum, CSRD can be used by companies as a medium to meet the stakeholders’ 
expectations for the company’s sustainability. By engaging in CSR activities, companies 
can maintain good relations with stakeholders. Thus, companies that engage in CSRD 
activities have a strong incentive to not engage in EM. Based on the arguments explained 
above, the first hypothesis: 
H1 CSRD is negatively associated with EM. 
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2.3 EM and CSRD 
Some prior studies also have investigated whether EM practices are influenced by level 
of CSRD. Prior et al. (2008) examined the relationship between EM and CSRD used 
income smoothing practices for measuring EM based on discretionary accruals. They 
used a sample of 593 companies from 26 countries. The results of their study found there 
is a positive relationship between EM and CSRD. Consistent with Prior et al. (2008), 
Choi et al. (2013) examined the relationship between EM and CSR of 2,042 Korean firms 
listed on the KOSPI market of the Korea Exchange from 2002 to 2008. They used the 
absolute value of abnormal discretionary accruals from the modified Jones models to 
measure EM, while CSR activities are measured by index published by Korea Economic 
Justice Institute (KEJI). Their result showed that firms have high quality earnings also 
have better CSR ratings. Based on the stakeholder-agency perspective, EM allows 
managers to look for their own interests. The consequence of this is that it will not only 
be detrimental to others (especially the key stakeholders), but it will also have a negative 
effect on the company’s financial performance if EM practices continue for a long time. 
To avoid the negative consequences of EM practices, managers may adopt CSR practices 
that can satisfy the various interests of the stakeholders. In this sense, CSR can be viewed 
as a strategy to meet the demands of stakeholders (Prior et al., 2008). In other words, 
managers who participate in EM try to compensate for those practices by implementing 
CSR. Grougiou et al. (2014) noted that companies that engage in EM practices are also 
more likely to be involved in CSR. Further, they found that firms that participated in EM 
tended to be more involved in CSR activities, however, the positive relationship between 
CSRD and EM was not statistically significant. 
More recently, Muttakin et al. (2015) provided evidence that managers had managed 
earnings also provided higher CSRD. The existence of a positive relationship can be 
explained by the fact that the managers have the purpose of obtaining the support of 
stakeholders, which reduces the risk of experiencing the negative impact of EM practices 
(Martínez-Ferrero et al., 2014). From the perspective of opportunistic behaviours, CSR 
activities may be used by managers as an entrenchment strategy. Under this strategy, the 
“manager believes that by satisfying stakeholders’ interests and projecting an image of 
social and environmental concern and awareness, he/she can reduce the likelihood of 
being scrutinised by satisfied stakeholders for his management of earnings” [Prior et al., 
(2008), p.162]. Thus, the second hypothesis is: 
H2 EM is positively associated with CSRD. 
3 Research methods 
3.1 Data and sample selections 
This study used a sample of 479 PLCs in the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during the 
period from 2012 to 2013. The year 2012 and 2013 were chosen as the current year when 
the study was conducted. Also, CSRD was collected from companies’ annual reports and 
financial data were gathered from the Bloomberg databases. The Bloomberg databases 
provide financial data around the word with high quality, accuracy and consistency. 
Table 1 presents the sample selection of this study. 
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Table 1 Sample selection 
Criteria 2012 2013 
Total company listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) 463 486 
Companies include in financial sectors  (102) (102) 
Companies did not provide CSR information in annual reports (126) (140) 
Total sample = 479 235 244 
3.2 Variables and measurements 
3.2.1 EM 
Schipper (1989, p 92) defined EM as “an effort to intervene in the process of preparation 
of external financial reporting in order to gain personal benefits.” Consistent with Kim  
et al. (2012), this study used RAM to measure EM practices. RAM also defined as “a 
deviation from normal operational practice which is driven by the managers’ desire to 
mislead at least some of the stakeholders in order to believe that the purposes of certain 
financial reporting has been fulfilled in normal operations” [Roychowdhury, (2006), 
p.337]. Three measures to detect RAM are: the level of abnormal operating cash flow, 
abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary load. Table 2 exhibits the 
measurement of variables. 
3.2.2 CSRD 
Guthrie and Matthews (1985) defined CSRD as the provision of information (both 
financial and non-financial) about an organisation’s interaction with its physical and 
social environment (including the environment, human resources, products and society) 
as stated in corporate annual reports or standalone reports. Consistent with previous 
studies of CSRD, a content analysis method was used to extract the information of 
environmental impact, labour practices, product responsibility, human rights, product 
responsibility and social aspects from the reports. The measurements of CSRD were 
items adopted from the Global Reporting Initiative version G.3.1. There were 74 items 
(30 environmental items, 14 labour practice items, 11 human rights items, ten social 
items and nine product responsibility items). Table 2 provides a summary of the 
measurement of variables. This study employed a disclosure index to measure the extent 
of CSRD as it enables researcher to better get insights into the level of CSR information 
communicated by companies. The disclosure index offers a valid and useful method for 
measuring the extent of CSRD. Joseph and Taplin (2011) found that disclosure index is a 
more predictable measurement of CSRD than content analysis. 
3.3 Analysis 
A two-stage least square (2SLS) analysis gives a more consistent and efficient estimation 
than ordinary least squares (OLS). A simultaneous relationship occurs when the 
endogenous repressor variables are correlated with the error or disturbance. The Hausman 
specification test was conducted before running the 2SLS analysis. 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , ,i t i t i t i t i t i tRAM CSRD FIRM LEV ROA ε     E E E E E  (1) 
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, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , ,i t i t i t i t i tCSRD RAM FIRM MTB ε    E E E E  (2) 
Table 2 Summary of the measurement of variables 
Variable Measurement 
CSRD CSRD index = number of items disclosed divided by total items. The GRI G3.1 
version is used as disclosure items. Of six themes, only five categories are used 
(economic theme was excluded). The score 1 will be given if item disclosed and 0 if 
not disclosed. 
Following Haniffa and Cooke (2002), the formula of the index is as follows: 
1
nj
t
j
Xij
CSRD
nj
  ¦  
CSRDj corporate social responsibility disclosure for firm j 
nj number of items expected for jth firm, nj ≤ 74 
Xij 1 if ith item disclosed, 0 if ith item not disclosed 
0 ≤ Ij ≤ 1 
RAM      1 0 1 1 1 1 2 11 Δt t t t t t t tCFO A A S A S A ε       D D E E  (1) 
   1 0 1 1 1 11t t t t t tCOGS A A S A ε     D D E  (2) 
     1 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 1Δ 1 Δ Δt t t t t t t tINV A A S A S A ε        D D E E  (3) 
       1 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 11 Δ Δt t t t t t t t t tPROD A A S A S A S A ε          D D E E E  (4) 
   1 0 1 1 1 1 11t t t t t tDISEXP A A S A ε      D D E  (5) 
_ _ _RAM AB CFO AB PROD AB DISEXP    (6) 
CFOt firm’s operational cashflow on year t 
At–1 firm’s total asset on previous year 
St firm’s net sales on year t 
ΔSt firm’s change in net sales on year t 
εt firm’s abnormal operational cashflow on year t (AB_CFO) 
COGSt cost of goods sold on year t 
ΔINVt changes in inventory on year t 
PRODt cost of production on the year t 
εt abnormal production cost (AB_PROD) 
DISEXPt discretionary load on the year t (sum of RnD expenses, advertising 
expenses and sales expenses and administration) 
εt abnormal discretionary load (AB_DISEXP) 
FIRM Market value of equity 
LEV Long-term debt divided by total assets 
ROA Earnings after tax divided by total assets 
MTB Market value of equity divided by book value of equity 
Notes: CSRD = corporate social responsibility disclosure; RAM = real activities 
manipulation; FIRM = firm size; LEV = leverage; ROA = return on assets;  
MTB = market-to-book of equity ratio. 
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4 Findings 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the 479 sample companies. The CSRD 
index’s mean is 13.4% with a minimum value of 1.3% and a maximum value of 94.7%. 
This mean indicates that the extent of companies’ CSRD is still low. With respect to the 
RAM variable, the maximum (minimum) value is 2.633 (–2.458). The mean (minimum; 
maximum) of RAM is 0.000 (–2.458; 2.633); this indicates that, on average, firms do not 
seem to engage in RAM. The descriptive statistics of the control variables are as follows: 
The mean (standard deviation) firm size was 28.017 (2.063), suggesting that most firms 
are relatively large; the leverage was 0.166 (0.178), suggesting that most firms are low in 
debt; the ROA was 0.050 (0.513), indicating that most firms are low in profitability and 
the market-to-book (MTB) equity ratio was 3.162 (8.926) indicating that most firms are 
low performance in market value of equity. 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
CSRD 479 .013 .947 .134 .097 
RAM 479 –2.458 2.633 .000 .517 
FIRM (log) 479 20.086 33.376 28.017 2.063 
LEV 479 .000 1.790 .166 .178 
ROA 479 –10.900 .620 .050 .513 
MTB 479 –54.148 151.236 3.162 8.926 
Notes: CSRD = corporate social responsibility disclosure; RAM = real activities 
manipulation; FIRM = firm size; LEV = leverage; ROA= return on assets;  
MTB = market-to-book equity ratio. 
Table 4 The result of the Hausman test 
Variable Coefficient t Sig. 
CSRD –12.446 –2.000 .046 
FIRM .219 2.646 .008 
LEV .573 2.160 .031 
ROA .097 2.143 .033 
Unstandardised residual 12.148 1.950 .050 
F-test = 7.121 
p-value = .000 
Notes: Dependent variable: RAM = real activities manipulation; independent variables: 
CSRD = corporate social responsibility disclosure; FIRM = firm size;  
LEV = leverage; ROA = return on assets; MTB = market-to-book equity ratio; 
unstandardised residual. 
The purpose of conducting a simultaneous testing was to examine whether the 
endogenous variable was correlated with the error or disturbance. A simultaneous testing 
can be carried out after the assumption of Hausman specification is met. Table 4 shows 
the result of the Hausman test. The results show that the unstandardised residual 
coefficient is significant at a level of 0.050, which means that there is a simultaneous 
relationship between RAM and CSRD. Thus, the 2SLS method can be used to estimate 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   10 F. Faisal et al.    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
the consistency and efficiency. The result shows that the F-value is 7.121 with a 
significance level of 0.000. Thus, it can be concluded that RAM acts as an endogenous 
variable. 
Table 5 presents the results of the 2SLS. In model (1), the coefficient of the 
unstandardised predicted value of CSRD is significantly negative (–12.446); this suggests 
that companies with higher CSRD are more ethical and less likely to participate in the 
manipulation of accounts. H1 is supported. Therefore, CSRD may be seen as a substitute 
mechanism rather than a complement mechanism. This finding is consistent with Kim  
et al. (2012), Hong and Andersen (2011), Cho and Chun (2015) and Choi et al. (2013). 
Table 5 2SLS: the relation between CSRD and EM 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
Constant –4.571 (–2.997)*** –0.157 (–1.027) 
RAM - 0.060 (0.632) 
CSRD –12.446 (–1.999)** - 
FIRM 0.219 (2.645)*** 0.010 (1.940)* 
LEV 0.573 (2.159)** - 
ROA 0.097 (2.142)** - 
MTB - –0.001 (–1.078) 
F-test (p-value) 8.523 (0.000) 14.026 (0.000) 
N 479 479 
R2 0.0670 0.081 
Notes: CSRD = corporate social responsibility disclosure; RAM = real activities 
manipulation; FIRM = firm size; LEV = leverage; ROA = return on assets;  
MTB = market-to-book of equity ratio. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
Model (1): dependent variable is RAM; independent variables are unstandardised 
predicted value of CSRD, FIRM, LEV and ROA. 
Model (2): dependent variable is CSRD; independent variables are unstandardised 
predicted value of RAM, FIRM and MTB. 
Table 6 The result of the Hausman test 
Variables Coefficient t Sig. 
ENVDISC –30.183 –2.539 .046 
FIRM .323 2.403 .017 
LEV .543 2.152 .032 
ROA .239 2.708 .007 
Unstandardised residual 29.883 1.979 .048 
F-test = 7.099 
p-value = .000 
Notes: Dependent variable: RAM = real activities manipulation; independent variables: 
ENVDISC = environmental disclosure; FIRM = firm size; LEV = leverage;  
ROA = return on assets; = MTB = market-to-book equity ratio. 
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Model (2) presents the result of the regression with CSRD as the dependent variable. The 
coefficient of the unstandardised predicted value of RAM is positive but insignificant 
(0.060), indicating that RAM does not have an effect on the extent of CSRD. Thus, H2 is 
rejected. Although the results of the Hausman test showed a simultaneous relationship 
between CSRD and EM, the findings of this study provided empirical evidence that 
companies with higher disclosed CSR activities are not statistically significantly related 
to a company’s engagement in EM activities. This finding does not support the studies of 
Choi et al. (2013) and Prior et al. (2008). 
Table 7 2SLSs: the relation of environmental disclosure and EM 
Independent variables Model (1) Model (2) 
Constant –7.258 (–2.538)*** –0.085 (–0.585) 
RAM - 0.070 (0.779) 
ENVDISC –30.183 (–1.999)** - 
FIRM 0.323 (2.402)** 0.005 (1.045) 
LEV 0.543 (2.151)** - 
ROA 0.239 (2.707)*** - 
MTB - –0.001 (–0.813) 
F-test (p-value) 8.523 (.000) 7.041 (.000) 
N 479 479 
R2 0.067 0.043 
Notes: ENVDISC = environmental disclosure; RAM = real activities manipulation; 
FIRM = firm size; LEV = leverage; ROA = return on assets;  
MTB = market-to-book of equity ratio. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
Model (1): dependent variable is RAM; independent variables are unstandardised 
predicted value of environmental disclosure, FIRM, LEV and ROA. 
Model (2): dependent variable is environmental disclosure; independent variables 
are unstandardised predicted value of RAM, FIRM and MTB. 
4.1 Sensitivity test 
The sensitivity analysis was conducted to test whether the result of the 2SLS was 
consistent; this was done by using another measurement of CSRD (namely environmental 
disclosure). Table 6 presents the result of the Hausman specification model test. The 
results show that the unstandardised residual coefficient is significant at a level of 0.048, 
which means that there is a simultaneous relationship between RAM and environmental 
disclosure. This finding is consistent with the main analysis. 
Table 7 presents the results of the 2SLS analysis. The result is consistent with the 
main result, which shows that companies with more disclosed environmental information 
are more likely to not engage in EM. 
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5 Conclusions 
This study aimed to examine the relationship between CSRD and EM. The result of this 
study provides empirical evidence that CSRD has a negative association with engaging in 
EM. The result is robust when we retest using another measure of CSRD (namely 
environmental disclosure). Findings of this study have made a significant contribution to 
the literature in several ways. First, the result of the study supports the application of the 
SAT to interpret the relationship between CSRD and EM. The contract of the relationship 
is not only between the company and shareholders but also with all of the stakeholders. 
Second, our finding supports the hypothesis that companies that participate in CSRD 
are more inclined to meet the demands of their stakeholders by developing a good 
relationship with them. One of the ways to boost good relations is to maintain the 
accountability and the quality of financial reporting, which increases the value of the 
company. Based on the result, it can be concluded that the relationship between CSRD 
and EM acts as substitution mechanism. Overall, the empirical findings of this study are 
valuable for the further development of insights concerning the relationship between 
CSRD practices and EM behaviour. 
This study had several limitations. First, this study did not consider the influence of 
several variables, such as industry and ownership type. The results of this study  
may differ as most of Indonesia’s companies are owned by families. In addition, the 
Indonesian Government’s regulations for CSR require companies in high-profile 
industries such as mining to report their CSR activities. Such a regulation may affect 
companies’ motivation for participating in CSRD. Although this study had limitations, 
the results provide implications both in theory as well as for management in practice. The 
results of this study show that, although a company might participate in more CSR 
activities, maintaining honesty and trustworthiness in financial reporting is still a priority. 
It allows a better understanding of social communication by community and business and 
accounting profession. The findings of this study can be used to consider policy factors 
that can foster companies to disclose more CSR information without reduce the quality of 
financial reporting. 
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